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LEGISLATION NOTES
CRIMINAL LAW-"INFAMOUS CRIMES"
IN ILLINOIS TODAY
The term "infamous crime," often used merely in moralistic discussions,
is one which, within the system of jurisprudence in Illinois, carries with it
consequences of a very serious nature. An individual convicted of an in-
famous crime may suffer any or all of the following deprivations: loss of
his vote at any state election,' ineligibility for the general assembly, 2 in-
eligibility for any office of profit or trust,3 inability to serve as a juror,4
weakening of his credibility as a witness,5 inability to serve as an executor6
and loss of the indigent citizen's privilege of appeal to the federal court of
appeals.7 In addition such a conviction of an infamous crime may serve as
grounds for divorce." The enormity of these consequences is self-evident,
and the need for care in defining such a term is equally clear.
Legislation has been enacted in Illinois within the past three years which
is of immediate importance regarding the scope and definition of the term
"infamous crime." In 1961 the Criminal Code was revised,9 in 1963 Illinois'
first Code of Criminal Procedure was enacted' ° and in that same year the
Election Code was amended." The specific changes made by these statutes
will be examined pursuant to an historical discussion of infamous crimes
and a synopsis of the law prior to 1961. Also, in light of the importance
attending a specific crime which has been designated infamous, an attempt
will be made to discover exactly what crimes are infamous in Illinois
today.
IILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 124-1 (1963); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, S 29A-5 (1963); ILL.
CONST. art. VII, § 7.
2 ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
3ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 124-1 (1963); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 29A-5 (1963); ILL.
CONST. art. IV, § 4.
4 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 124-1 (1963); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 29A-5 (1963).
5 People v. Decker, 310 Il. 234, 141 N.E. 710 (1923); People v. Birdette, 22 l1.2d 577,
177 N.E.2d 170 (1961).
6 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 77 (1963).
7 Austin v. U.S., 40 F.Supp. (E.D. Ill. 1941).
8 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1 (1963). 10 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 (1963).
9 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 (1961). 1 1 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46 (1963).
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LEGISLATIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
The foundation for the term "infamous crime" was established in the
Roman law concept of infamia where ". . moral censure . . .involved
disqualification for certain rights both in public and in private law."12
Such was the case in the English common-law, where one convicted of a
crimen falsi (crime of falsifying) was not allowed to appear as a witness.'3
It was the nature, or infamy, of the crime itself which determined wheth-
er or not it was to be accorded an infamou; status. 14
The constitution of 1818, Illinois' init-ial constitution, fathered the
growth of the concept, infamous crime, in Illinois. Article II, section 30
thereof, read as follows:
The general assembly shall have full powers to exclude from the privilege of
electing or being elected any person convicted of bribery, perjury or any other
infamous crime.
The constitution of 1848 contained t:he same provision as above
quoted, 15 and also added Article VI, section 8, which provided that the
general assembly "shall have full powers to pass laws excluding from the
right of suffrage persons convicted of infamous crimes." The present con-
stitution, adopted in 1870, renders one convicted of "bribery, perjury or
other infamous crime" incapable of holding office or sitting on the general
assembly,' 6 and further excludes suffrage from one convicted of an in-
famous crime,17 the latter restriction being conditioned upon the legisla-
tive enactment of appropriate laws. Presc'nding from the constitutional
convention's intended scope of the term "infamous," it appears at the very
least that the constitutions specifically included bribery and perjury with-
in that term, since each convention employed the terminology, "bribery,
perjury or other infamous crime." This is very significant in light of the
legislative enactment of the criminal code, to be discussed forthwith,
which omitted bribery from enumerated infamous crimes.
In 1827 the legislature enacted a statute specifying those crimes declared
to be infamous and provided that the punishment for the conviction there-
of was the loss of the right to vote, hold office, serve as a juror and appear
as a witness.18 The crimes listed were: rape, kidnapping, willful and cor-
12 IV POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 5 363.
13 PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW S 15 (1957).
14 1 RoscoE ON CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 134 (5th Am. ed. 1861); 1 GREENLEAF ON Evi-
DENCE S 373 (16th ed. 1899); 5 ILL. L. REv. 108 (1913).
15 ILL. CONST. art. II, § 30 (1848).
1 6 ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (1870). 17 ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 7 (1870).
18 Ill. Laws 1827, Criminal Code, 15th division, § 162.
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rupt perjury or subornation of perjury, arson, burglary, robbery, sodomy
or other crime against nature, forgery, counterfeiting, bigamy and lar-
ceny.19 Amendments to this statute have added three crimes to this list,
namely, incest in 1845,20 murder in 1874,21 and sale of narcotics in 1953.22
In addition, the disability of testifying was eliminated from the sanctions
of the statute in 1874,23 and in 1911 larceny was limited to that for which
the penalty was imprisonment in the penitentiary. 24
Strikingly apparent from the above enumeration of infamous crimes is
the absence of the crime of bribery, despite the apparent intent of the con-
stitutional convention to clothe this crime with an infamous designation.
Also clear is a seeming lack of consistency in the choice of the crimes
which were specified as infamous. All of the crimes so listed apparently
have an element of moral turpitude therein; however, very serious crimes,
such as treason and abortion, were not included, and the crimes of murder
and incest, both extremely heinous, were missing from the initial statute.
Thus, the criteria upon which the original selection was made are not at
all clear, resulting in confusion as to the meaning of the term infamous.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
With the meaning of the term infamous crime left in such a nebulous
state, it would seem that the courts, as ultimate arbiters, would have set-
tled upon a judicial interpretation of the term. Such is not the case, how-
ever, and the courts have vacillated between two different positions based
upon conflicting theories. One theory is that the legislature has the power
to define infamous crimes and that such definition limits infamous crimes
to those crimes which the legislature has listed. The other theory rests
upon the common law and is to the effect that the definition of infamous
crime is not limited to the specific crimes so enumerated, but is broader
and includes crimes which were infamous within the meaning of the com-
mon law at the time of the adoption of the constitution.
The former view was relied upon by the court in People v. Russell,25 in
which a conviction of petit larceny on information was reversed. The re-
versal was on the grounds that petit larceny was an infamous crime by
statute, the conviction of which carried with it punishment in addition to
the fine and imprisonment, thereby requiring prosecution by indictment.
19 ]bid.
20 Ill. Laws 1845, Criminal Jurisprudence, S 174, at 182.
21 Ill. Laws 1874, Criminal Jurisprudence, div. 2, § 7, at 348.
22 111. Laws 1953 ch. 38, § 1 at 1529.
23 Ill. Laws 1874, Criminal Jurisprudence, div. 2, 6 at 348.
24 Ill. Laws 1911, Criminal Jurisprudence, div. 2, § 7 at 290.
25 245 Il. 268, 91 N.E. 1075 (1910).
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The prosecutor argued that petit larceny was by its nature a misdemeanor
and that the intention of the legislature in enacting the statute specifying
the infamous crimes was to limit said crines to felonies. The court dis-
agreed, saying that other misdemeanors carried with them the loss of cer-
tain civil rights,26 thus indicating the intention of the legislature not to
limit the scope of the statute to felonies. The court then said, "Whether
or not a crime is infamous in this state depends, not upon the common
law, but upon the statute." 27
A conviction of burglary was reversed in People v. Green28 where the
state submitted evidence of a prior conviction of one of the defendants of
assault with intent to commit robbery. The court held that assault with in-
tent to commit robbery was not infamous according to the statute and
could therefore not be shown to discredit the witness. In rebuttal to the
state's allegation that the crime was as depraved as actual robbery and,
hence, should be includable within the delinition of infamous crime, the
court said:
"Whether the crime is infamous depends not upon the common law or the
court's view of its moral aspects but upon the statute."
29
An allegation was made in Getz v. Getz3" that the conviction by a gen-
eral court-martial of deserting the United States Army in time of war was
a felony and hence, was grounds for divorce. The court held the offense
not to be a felony within the meaning of the statute, and in a dictum said:
... [N]either is military desertion nor any offense of similar nature included
in the list of infamous crimes as defined by the statute.3 1
The other theory, viz. that the interpretation must be made with regard
to the meaning accorded infamous crime by the common law at the time
of the constitution's adoption, was impliedly followed by the court in
Holmes v. Illinois,32 in which the lower court was held to be in error due
to its instructing the jury that malicious slander is an infamous offense. In
its rationale the court did not rely upon the statute in effect at the time,
but instead quoted Blackstone and held that by the common law such slan-
der was never classified infamous.
The crime of bribery in elections was held to be included within the
26 Id. at 277, 91 N.E. at 1077. E.g., malfeasance in office, habitual intoxication of
officers and most interestingly, bribery in elections.
27 d. at 275, 91 N.E. at 1077.
28292 111. 351, 127 N.E. 50 (1920).
291 d. at 35, 127 N.E. at 52.
30 332 Ill. App. 364, 75 N.E.2d 530 (1947).
31d. at 36, 75 N.E.2d at 531. 1264 Ill. 294 (1872).
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meaning of infamous crimes in Article VII, section 7 of the constitution3
by the court in Christie v. People,34 despite its absence from the statute.3 5
In making this determination the court stated:
The offense of bribery in elections involves moral turpitude and falls within
the class of crimes deemed infamous, . . .We do not see how it can be said that
the framers of the constitution, or the people, did not intend that bribery in
elections should be includable, within the meaning of section 7.36
In a decision carefully restricted to the creation of vacancies in office,
the court in People ex rel Keenan v. McGuane,3 7 held a federal conviction
of tax evasion33 carrying a penalty of two years imprisonment, to be in-
famous within the meaning of section 25-2 of the Election Code.3 9 In
holding that a determination of the meaning of infamous insofar as a va-
cancy in office is affected, the court stated:
. . . we conclude that any public officer convicted, in the Federal court or in
the court of any sister State, of a felony which falls within the general classifi-
cation of being inconsistent with commonly accepted principles of honesty and
decency, or which involves moral turpitude, stands convicted of an infamous
crime under the common law as interpreted when our constitution was adopted
in 1870, and that such conviction creates a vacancy in such office. 40
Although the decision in People ex rel Keenan v. McGuane4 ' is clearly
limited, it represents a marked departure from the trend toward the strict
statutory dependence exhibited in People v. Russell,42 People v. Green,43
and Getz v. Getz.44
Thus, prior to the enactment of the legislation, viz. the amendment to
the Criminal Code in 1961, 4 5 the passage of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure in 1963,46 and the revision of the Election Code in 1963, 4 7 very little
could be said with assurance concerning the definition and scope of the
term infamous crime in Illinois. One comment is worthy of note, however,
and this may be the only established criterion existing. That is, the trend,
33 ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 7 (1870).
3 206 Ill. 337, 69 N.E. 33 (1903).
35 Ill. Laws 1874, Criminal Jurisprudence, div. 2, § 7 at 348.
36 Christie v. People, supra note 34, at 341, 69 N.E. at 35.
37 13 Ill.2d 520, 150 N.E.2d 168 (1958).
38 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1958); 26 U.S.C. § 145(b) (1958).
39 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 25-2 (1958).
40 People ex rel Keenan v. McGuane, supra note 37, at 534, 150 N.E.2d at 175.
41 Supra note 38.
42 Supra note 25. 45 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 (1961).
43 Supra note 28. 46 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 (1963).
44 Supra note 30. 47 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46 (1963).
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solidified by legislation, to limit the scope of the infamous crime to those
crimes for which the penalty is imprisonment in the penitentiary. Spurred
by the decision in People v. Russell,48 the legislature in the following year
changed the provision of the Criminal Code49 which defined infamous
crimes, providing that larceny should be infamous only if punishment was
by imprisonment in the penitentiary. 50 Further, the provision of the Elec-
tion Code 5' defining infamous crimes was enacted in 1943 and limited the
scope of infamous crimes to those crimes for which the punishment was
imprisonment in the penitentiary. Accordingly, one would be led to ex-
pect the legislature to attempt to remedy -he deficiencies heretofore in-
dicated with regard to the meaning of the term infamous crime. Certainly
that opportunity was afforded the legislature when it enacted and amended
the statutes now in question.
STATUTORY CHANGES
The provision of the Criminal Code which defines infamous crimes, as
amended, 52 quite naturally includes altered terminology to accompany the
change in the titles of the substantive crimes, but more important is the
omission of the crime of counterfeiting. The legislative committee made
no comments regarding this omission, thus lending credence to the possi-
bility that the omission was one of error, rot of intention. This position
seems to have been supported when the drafting committee for the Code
of Criminal Procedure53 stated in their comments appended to the pro-
posed draft:
... Article 60 of this Code will replace section 587 of chapter 38, which was
modified in 1961 to conform to the terminology of the new Criminal Code of
1961. 5 4 (Emphasis added.)
Since the drafting committee took the pains to explain the purpose of
the amendment, namely, that it was modified to conform to the terminol-
ogy of the Criminal Code, it follows that if there had been any other pur-
pose it would surely have been indicated, especially when it amounts to a
change in the substance of the provision.
The adoption of the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1963 brought an-
48 Supra note 25.
49111. Laws 1911, Criminal Jurisprudence, div. 2, § 7 at 290.
50 lbid.
51 I11. Laws 1943, ch. 46, § 29-38 at 253.
52 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 587 (1961).
5 3 COMMITTEE COMMENTS, TENTATIVE FINAL DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED ILLINOIS CODE
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, (1963).
541d. at 154.
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other change to the list of enumerated, infamous crimes, viz. the addition
of the crime of bribery. The drafting committee, in its comments in the
proposed draft,5 5 indicated that this addition had already been made judi-
cially by the decision in Christie v. People.56 In the same breath, however,
the committee stated:
The purpose of this section is to define what crimes are infamous. The Su-
preme Court has held that whether or not a crime is infamous depends entirely
on the statute; People v. Green.57/58
The committee is in the anomalous position of accepting a judicial de-
termination of the scope of infamous crimes and at the same moment de-
claring that the legislature has the exclusive right to declare what is in-
famous. The committee would have been on much stronger ground had
they based such a determination on the constitutional inclusion of bribery
and the intent of the framers of the constitution to render this crime
infamous.
The committee, in the proposed draft, also included within the offense,
conspiracy to commit any of the listed crimes.99 In justification for such
inclusion, the committee said that, since an act in furtherance of the con-
spiracy was now required by the Criminal Code,60 the moral turpitude
involved therewith is as great if not greater than committing the principal
offense alone. 61 Despite this apparent reliance on what would appear to be
the classical approach to the definition of infamous crimes, the legislature
omitted this provision from the final draft. 2
One change was made in the Election Code, 6a with regard to the scope
of the infamous crime, which is worthy of note. The prior section there-
of 64 defined infamous crime, insofar as the Election Code was concerned,
as the conviction of any crime under the act if the punishment was by im-
prisonment in the penitentiary. The amended version' conditions such
declaration of infamy on the sentencing to the penitentiary and not simply
the conviction of an offense, the punishment for which is sentencing to
the penitentiary. That is, the legislature has specifically exempted those
individuals from the sanctions of the act who are convicted but not sen-
55 Id. at 154, 155. 56Supra note 34. 57Supra note 28.
58 COMMMITTEE COMMENTS, supra note 53, at 154.
59 Id. at 155.
WoILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 8-2 (1961).
61 COMMITTEE COMMENTS, supra note 53 at 155.
62 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, Code of Criminal Procedure (1963).
63 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 46, § 29A-5 (1963)
64 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 46, § 29-26 (1963).
65 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 46, 29A-5 (1963).
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tenced, or who are convicted but sent to an institution other than the pen-
itentiary. It would seem that this statute indicates that the legislature has
taken one more step toward acceptance of' more strict requisites in defin-
ing the infamous crime, i.e., the trend start.ed in the People v. Russell"6 de-
cision has been extended to actual sentencing, rather than simply convic-
tion.
CONCLUSION
Emerging from this hodgepodge of constitutional, legislative and judi-
cial history, appears the infamous crime, a dangerous, unpredictable ele-
ment lost in a labyrinth and lacking any gu deposts by which it may be led
therefrom.
As indicated heretofore, the term infamous crime carries with it serious
consequences, thereby demanding clarification of such term. The legisla-
ture clearly has not satisfied this need, bui: has instead, fathered an abor-
tive definition listing specific infamous crimes based on what appears to be
an arbitrary selection. The judiciary has done little more to clarify this
problem since it has vacillated between two theories, one of which is based
upon the notion that the legislature has the exclusive power to define in-
famous crimes, arbitrary or not.
Thus, suggestions would appear to be in order. Initially, the legislature
should determine the theory upon which a crime will be declared infa-
mous, whether it be the nature of the crime, the penalty attached to the
crime or some other basis.
Then a standard can be chosen which reasonably satisfies the theory
upon which infamous crimes are based. The term felony has seemed to be
too broad a definition, or standard, in the past, but this was indicated
originally because of the inclusion of certain misdemeanors, such as petit
larceny within the scope of infamous crimes. In addition, the legislature
and the judiciary have alluded to moral turpitude as being present in the
infamous crime. Can it be said that there are any felonies in Illinois today
which do not involve moral turpitude?
At any rate, a listing of specific infamous crimes is apparently inade-
quate in face of our changing society, and an intelligent definition of the
term infamous crime should take this factor into account. Whether the
legislature decides on conviction of a felony as the standard or any other
standard, the choice should be made with regard to the problems which
have been pointed out herein. Furthermore, the legislature should take
care to specifically incorporate this standard into all areas of the law
wherein the infamous crime lurks.
Dallas Ingemunson
66 Supra note 25.
